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In June 2020, Patrick Pelata, former COO of Renault, expressed 
doubts about the future of the franchised dealership system, so dear 
to all vehicle manufacturers. The automotive industry faced huge 
adaptation problems, including the need to short-circuit the dealer 
system, whose economics he did not understand. Liberated from his 
former obligation to toe the party line, he could of course now think 
the unthinkable and say the unspeakable. These doubts have, 
however, been around for a long time. 
As its then new model T sold across urban and rural America, Ford 
found an urgent need to do something to organize cost-effective 
maintenance and repair for owners, rather than just leave this to local 
blacksmiths and mechanics. This was the origin of the franchised 
dealer system, conceived as an assurance of quality after-sales 
support for the motoring public. We have come a long way since then 
and not entirely for the best. 
The system has become entrenched throughout the world but more in 
support of new vehicle sales and of the manufacturers’ individual 
brands than anything else. In other words, now on the side of the 
supplier and not that of the consumer. There is also an inevitable 
imbalance of power between the local dealer and the huge 
corporation. 
In the US, dealers are often significant local businesses and their 
have traditionally been protected by State laws that enshrine their 
exclusive right to sell new cars, often of more than one brand. In 
Europe, exclusive vertical distribution arrangements are formally 
illegal under the provisions of the Treaty of Rome. 
Manufacturers flouting this prohibition eventually led to the first Block 
Exemption Regulation, which allowed them to continue the practice. 
The framers of that first regulation were, however, also at pains to 
prevent manufacturers from intervening in the final sales transaction 
with the end customer. 
While this distribution model was effective in an age of demand for 
new cars exceeding supply and appropriate while they were still 
somewhat mysterious and delicate technically, it has aged and 
become outdated as the new car market has matured and become 
saturated. 
Manufacturers have responded by adding more models and replacing 
them more often, which is a zero-sum game, given that they all play it. 
The result has been to inflate costs, increase pressure for discounts 
and depress margins. In Europe, franchised dealers are only 
notionally independent of their brand franchisors – who are also at 
liberty to by-pass them in serving the ever larger fleet market. 
Importer-distributors are normally under the control of the brands. 
There is no-one to talk back and force marginal models, brands or 
even manufacturers out of the market. Incumbents are protected 
against new entrants. 
These brand-specific retail monopolies are inefficient (how much 
traffic do you see in the average showroom ?) and costly – up to 30% 
of the pre-tax price of a new car. But they have enabled 
manufacturers and dealers to seek to make up for inadequate 
margins on new cars (at least for volume brands) through attempted 
abuse of monopoly power in the aftermarket. This has involved both 
attempts to coerce new car owners into using franchised dealer 
workshops rather than independent repairers, and to deprive  the 
independents of the increasing amounts of technical information 
needed to maintain and repair modern cars. 
All this has caused perennial trouble with consumer bodies and with 
the extremely powerful anti-trust authority of the European 
Commission, which grants the Block Exemption. While the 
Commission has given up on its earlier attempt to redress the balance 
of power between manufacturers and dealers in new car sales, it is 
adamant in its intention to keep the independent aftermarket in 
existence, so as to provide an alternative to car owners. It should be 
remembered that 3 of 4 car sales transactions are of used cars. New 
cars are increasingly bought by the fleet sector. 70% of the 
aftermarket is independent. The dealer aftermarket essentially 
supports cars in their first cycle of ownership only. 
The gross margins granted by manufacturers to dealers on new cars 
are severely limited, with ex-post facto bonuses awarded for achieving 
pre-agreed sales targets – with the obligation to sell the full product 
range. No cherry picking the attractive models only. This is still not a 
living wage. As in new cars, the manufacturers are the de facto 
monopoly suppliers to their dealers of the necessary ranges of spare 
parts, exercising similar margin control. 
Even in a good year for new car sales, parts (mainly not made by the 
manufacturers but by their suppliers) form 10% of their turnover but 
40% of their gross profit. The dealer’s showroom and parts 
department are cross-subsidized by disproportionately high margins 
on labour hours, out-pricing independent repairers by 50% or more. 
Dealer workshops are generally well equipped and trained but price-
uncompetitive and and made less accessible in practice through 
fragmentation between brands and the tradition of collocating them 
with showrooms. 
They are used to pre-ordering parts for known service jobs, enabling 
fairly tight spare parts distribution chains but these then bear an 
estimated 20-25% penalty through redundancy across 30-40 car 
brands. The independent repairers are more friendly and accessible – 
and much cheaper – but come under no brand umbrella. Schemes to 
chain them and reassure consumers about their quality have never 
really succeeded. 
These garages are used not to having to order their parts until the car 
is on the ramp, as these have been made available almost instantly 
from competing local independent parts factors. This has traditionally 
involved large amounts of local stocks. As they cover all makes and 
models, there is not the lateral brand-based fragmentation but high 
vertical distribution chain costs. The increasing grouping of factors 
through acquisition or trade groups has not solved this problem but 
has simply resulted in increased pressure on the parts suppliers for 
discounts. 
The franchised dealer and independent aftermarkets in effect almost 
collude not to compete directly with each other. In fact spare parts 
price lists on the two sides have been tacitly kept in close alignment, 
although there are some signs this breaking down in some places.  
This house of cards, while internally metastable, is highly vulnerable 
to a major external shock. New car sales have taken a tremendous 
knock because of Covid 19 and a bad Brexit will not help either. 
Newly impoverished consumers who furthermore have more incentive 
to work from home will have much less to buy new cars. 
Apart from the impact on showrooms, there will be a double shock to 
dealer workshops – fewer first-owner cars entering them, more used 
cars deserting them. This will destroy the already slender profits of 
dealers and dealer groups. Internet parts direct sales to repairers by 
suppliers are a deadly threat to the independent parts distributors, 
collapsing prices and margins. 
Again, Covid 19 has sharply accelerated the general development of 
e-commerce. If parts prices collapse, the vehicle manufacturers are in 
trouble. They will have a strong incentive to unbundle the costly 
single-brand exclusive dealership system, sell direct to consumers 
and accept the emergence of powerful independent importer-
distributors, who will not tolerate marginal products. 
The potential knock-on effects on the whole automotive sector, which 
is already not in good shape financially and struggling with the new 
technologies, will be enormous. 
 
